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Abstract—Industrial control systems rely more and more on 
digital technologies. Although the cyber risk such technologies 
induce is widely judged as serious, especially for critical 
infrastructures, these systems have generally not been designed 
to serve cybersecurity purposes. Instead they were thought first 
for serving operational efficiency. It thus becomes critical to 
study cyber threats in industrial environments and experimental 
test beds are needed to evaluate risks, physical consequences of 
cyber incidents, and performance of countermeasures. The test 
bed we present here focuses on studying cyber risks and their 
mitigation in IEC 61850 power utility automation systems. The 
operational part is composed of engineering computers, 
supervision software, off-the-shelf intelligent relays (Intelligent 
Electronic Device – IED), a hardware-in-the-loop process 
simulation, and the cybersecurity tools include an attack 
generation station and a network analyzer. In this paper, we 
present the operational part, giving details on the power grid 
hardware-in-the-loop simulation and its importance in the 
understanding of cyber consequences on the global system. The 
article concludes giving preliminary experimental results 
showing consequences of a false data injection attack on a simple 
electrical architecture. 
Keywords—cybersecurity; IDS; smart-grid; test bed; hardware-
in-the-loop; IEC 61850; electrical protection; false data injection 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The two last decades have given examples of blackouts 
caused by both informatics bugs [1] and cyber-attacks [2]. 
They make it plain that there is an urgent need of developing 
and deploying cybersecurity means to secure the smart-grid. 
There exist a wide range of them: some to be included at 
design time of products (e.g. secure boot of devices) and others 
to be set up when conceiving automation systems (e.g. 
Network-based Intrusion Detection System – NIDS). As 
available today, automation system technologies (relays, 
communication protocols, supervision software…) offer very 
few cybersecurity mechanisms for two main reasons: first 
because the threat is rather recent and Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) often have a many-decade lifetime, and second 
because transposing security technologies from business field 
to industrial field is widely considered as difficult and not 
always relevant. Research is a necessity to develop 
cybersecurity methods and tools for ICS, and particularly for 
smart-grid control environments. 
Such research cannot be run in real facilities and dedicated 
test beds help to discover cyber vulnerabilities in industrial 
control applications, to understand their possible impacts on the 
facilities, to develop cybersecurity solutions, to test and 
validate them. The test bed we are setting up specifically 
concerns Substation Automation System (SAS), which is 
responsible for electrical protection, i.e. the mechanisms 
ensuring infrastructure resiliency to electrical faults. Its 
components use Ethernet-based communication protocols, such 
as Modbus/TCP or more recently IEC 61850. Using such 
standard technologies introduces vulnerabilities in SAS, which 
if exploited may lead to consequences out SAS boundaries, as 
critical as a blackout for instance. The objective of this test 
bench is thus the study of cybersecurity in IEC 61850 
communication networks and systems for power utility 
automation. 
Section II of this article explains the basics of IEC 61850 
electrical protection. Section III presents similar initiatives. 
Section IV describes the proposed test bed. A concrete example 
of an attack scenario is given in section V with experimental 
results. To conclude the paper, section VI gives an insight of 
the global research project this test bed is part of.  
II. ELECTRICAL PROTECTION 
Electrical protection role is to stem breakdown, to contain it 
and prevent it from spreading and causing a cascading failure. 
Protection is realized by SAS whose protection relays 
continuously monitor the state of the supervised electrical 
components and isolate them when they are subjected to 
serious disturbances such as short circuits. Protection 
mechanisms cannot prevent disturbances from occurring, they 
aim at limiting their impact instead. Their main purpose is to 
protect people from electrical accidents and power assets from 
damages (a three-phase short-circuit on medium-voltage bus 
bars can melt up to 50 kg of copper in one second), and to 
provide service continuity [3]. 
 A. Selectivity 
Selectivity is key to electrical protection, it is essential for 
maintaining service continuity. It consists in localizing and 
disconnecting the fault part of the power grid, and no more, 
while maintaining under power the greatest part of the 
architecture [4]. This is done by opening the circuit breaker 
(CB) immediately upstream to the fault and that CB alone. 
There are many selectivity methods, among which the two 
main are time-based and logical or communication-based 
selectivity. In Figure 1, the fault on transmission line A is 
observed by both protecting relays A and B. The relay the 
closest to the fault, A, is supposed to open its associated CB A 
if the fault is persistent. If relay B still observes the fault after a 
configured time-delay, it means that CB A has failed to trip and 
relay B opens CB B. In a wider application there could be C 
and D relays/CBs with longer time delays. Logical selectivity 
ensures a quicker isolation of the affected power assets because 
it does not rely on programmed time-delays: relay A sends a 
command to its upstream relay B to prevent it from tripping 
CB B. If the CB A fails to open and the fault still exists, relay 
A stops sending its blocking command to relay B that opens 
CB B. 
In conventional protection systems, such logical selectivity 
blocking commands are transmitted from relay to relay through 
copper wires. In IEC 61850 design, these hard wired command 
signal exchange is replaced by a high speed inter-relay 
communication, thus reducing cost. In Figure 1, IED stands for 
Intelligent Electronic Device and denotes intelligent relay, that 
is a relay with digital capacities, especially an IEC 61850 relay. 
Fig. 1. Protection and selectivity systems. 
B. IEC 61850 high speed inter-relay communication 
Among the three IEC 61850 protocols, one is devoted to 
inter-IED high-speed information exchange: GOOSE (Generic 
Object Oriented Substation Event). To meet IEC 61850 
standard requirements its end-to-end transfer time must be less 
than 4ms. This time-critical specification explains GOOSE 
implementation as an Ethernet Link layer-based protocol 
(mapped on ISO/IEC 8802-3): GOOSE messages are 
broadcasted over the Ethernet network, IEDs that need a 
specific-GOOSE message content must have been subscribed 
to it at configuration time of the substation. To ensure 
reliability of such communications, message publication 
follows a periodical mechanism: in stable conditions, the same 
information is published with a T0 period. When a data item 
changes, its new value is sent at a higher frequency, then 
publication rhythm progressively slows down back to stable 
conditions. Details about GOOSE protocol are given in the 
standard [5] and in [6]. 
III. RELATED WORKS 
Literature is full of examples of test beds developed for 
cybersecurity of the smart-grid. Power grid simulation 
software with hardware-in-the-loop often serves the purpose 
of evaluating the performance of a developed tool. This is the 
objective of the experimental framework depicted in [7]-[8]: 
its end is to test the presented IDS (Intrusion Detection 
System). Simulink is used to run the virtual physical model of 
a transmission line. A communication module then manages 
Modbus communication with a PLC (Programmable Logic 
Controller) emulating a protection relay and performing the 
overcurrent protection algorithm. Similarly, the test bed set up 
for testing the IDS of [9] uses a Real-Time Digital Simulator 
(RTS), that is a commercial software for power grid 
simulation running on-the-fly to ensure a behavior as close to 
a real network as possible. Such real-time capabilities may be 
useful when evaluating time performance of the designed IDS. 
RTS simulation is hardwired to real relays and measurement 
units to avoid time delay induced by communication between 
process simulation and real devices. This solution is costly, 
though. Communication protocol in control network is 
Modbus/TCP too. 
This second test bench is actually part of a platform 
developed at Mississippi State University (MSU) [10], which 
is very comparable to Idaho National Laboratory initiative 
[11] or the G-ICS lab (see next section) with its double 
objective, teaching and research in cybersecurity of many 
critical industries. 
Test beds dedicated to cybersecurity in IEC 61850 systems 
exist but are not well documented. We can mention two 
initiatives from British Columbia Institute of Technology [12] 
and Freiburg Intelligent and Secured Systems Institute iSIS 
[13]. 
IV. TEST BED 
Ense3 Grenoble Institute of Technology, together with 
GIPSA-lab (Grenoble Images Speech Signal and Control 
laboratory), has developed an experimental platform dedicated 
to ICS interoperability and cybersecurity, G-ICS (GreEn-ER1 
Industrial Control Systems Sandbox) [14]. The presented test 
bed comes as a part of G-ICS. Its objective is the study of 
cybersecurity in IEC 61850 communication networks and 
systems for power utility automation. It includes all typical 
components of a SAS: 
• Ethernet network for supervision-to-IEDs and inter-
IEDs communications. 
• Off-the-shelf IEDs from diverse vendors: Current 
experiments use a bay controller, an overcurrent 
protection relay, a transformer protection relay and a 
feeder protection relay from two vendors. Other IEDs 
are available but have not been operated yet. 
• Engineering workstations with configuration tools. 
• Supervision applications (such as PCVue) and 
Human-Machine Interfaces (HMI). 
1. Grenoble Energy - Enseignement Recherche (Grenoble Energy -  
Teaching Research): a center of innovation for Energy field 
 Regarding the process, that is the power grid, we do not 
have access to any real infrastructure (neither real-world one 
nor small-size laboratory one). But the process must be part of 
such a test bench dedicated to cybersecurity of the automation 
systems controlling it to comprehend possible impacts of cyber 
risks on the physical infrastructure. We thus made the choice of 
a feasible and affordable solution: hardware-in-the-loop 
simulation where electrical architectures are simulated by a 
software platform but still controlled and monitored by real off-
the-shelf IEDs. Of course, such a solution helps understanding 
the system behavior but cannot give a complete representation 
of components interactions. A STM32-based I/O 
(Input/Output) card was developed by GIPSA-lab to ensure 
signal conversion between simulation and IEDs. Simulation 
software communicates with the I/O card over UDP for 
sending and receiving both analog and binary values to and 
from the IED physical connections. The card is wired to the 
IED binary I/O and to its measurement modules. 
Regarding cybersecurity tools, an attacking computer is 
connected to the high-speed real-time network and launches 
false data injection and spoofing GOOSE attacks, and another 
computer runs our anomaly detection tool.  
Fig. 2. IEC 61850 cybersecurity test bed. 
V. ATTACK SCENARIO EXAMPLE 
A. Protection scenario 
Let us consider a simple distribution substation from the 
typical substation topologies used as reference in the IEC 
61850 standard [5]. These are classified by types 
(transformation or distribution) and size (small, medium, 
large) to be representative of worldwide substations. Figure 3 
shows the considered distribution single-line diagram with an 
overcurrent protection and a backup protection. Logical 
selectivity as explained in section II is implemented here. 
When an overload or a phase-to-phase short-circuit occurs 
downstream line 1, the associated protection relay IED 1 
measures an overcurrent. It simultaneously sends a trip signal 
to CB 1, the CB directly upstream to the fault, and publishes a 
GOOSE message with the faulty current value and a Boolean 
variable to prevent CB 2 from opening. When CB 1 operating 
time has elapsed and fault is still present, meaning CB 1 has 
failed to open, or if CB 1 has an internal failure, IED 1 
changes blocking Boolean variable to false. When IED 2 
receives the corresponding GOOSE message, it sends a trip 
signal to CB 2. 
Fig. 3. Example of a distribution substation with overcurrent protection. 
B. Risk analysis 
The IEC 62351 [15] standard provides requirements about 
data and communication security in power systems. It points 
out the importance of risk assessment in the process of 
understanding cybersecurity risk and deploying 
countermeasures to target only pertinent assets and to the right 
level of security. No risk assessment methods or threat 
modeling has been developed specifically for substation 
communication, though. Attempts of assessing cyber risk in 
the smart-grid can be found in literature [16] and help to run 
such an analysis at the scale of a substation, first step of a 
global cyber risk analysis covering the distribution grid. 
Cyber threats in IEC 61850 power utility automation 
systems include: malware insertion to modify IED programs 
or erase them, theft of credentials and passwords to launch 
malicious operations from work and supervision stations, 
communication integrity violation such as spoofing and false 
data injection…  
Considering the simple distribution substation described in 
previous paragraph, we focus our risk analysis onto false data 
injection in the high-speed Ethernet network. Such an attack 
can cause CB 2 to trip inappropriately or conversely to not trip 
when it should. In case of an inappropriate trip, the whole 
substation is de-energized since CB 2 protects the incoming 
feeder line. If there is an electrical fault on line 1 and neither 
CB 1 nor CB 2 trips, fault is not isolated and possible 
consequences are physical damages to substation components 
(worst possible case being destruction) and/or substation 
breakdown. 
Of course, we consider a single protection mechanism in 
this case study but a single IED may implement many and a 
substation has multiple layers of protection like concentric 
barriers so if an inner barrier fails next one takes over. All the 
electrical protection layers should be examined when 
assessing cyber risk with both success and failure outcomes of 
protection mechanisms. 
C. Attack model 
A fictive attacker wants to disturb the production of a 
factory. His/her target is then the substation responsible for 
powering the factory facilities, which topology is shown in 
Figure 3. We assume that the attacker can connect to the 
substation Ethernet network and sniff or send packets. We also 
assume he/she knows the substation GOOSE messages 
configuration. The attacker is thus able to read GOOSE 
  
Fig. 5. GOOSE traffic 
during attack scenario. 
messages, forge new ones and inject them on the network for 
targeted IEDs to read them and use their malicious content. 
Attacker’s objective is to de-energize the facility. He/she 
sniffs GOOSE packets of the substation until the situation of 
an overcurrent on line 1. He/she then injects GOOSE 
messages with the genuine current value (greater than 
configured overcurrent threshold) and Boolean variable “CB 1 
Failure” as TRUE while its genuine value is FALSE. Attack 
timeline is depicted in Figure 4. Once IED 2 has read an attack 
GOOSE message it denies following genuine GOOSE flow 
because of mismatching message counters [5]-[6]. 
Fig. 4. Protection scenario, its associated genuine GOOSE communication 
published by IED 1 and GOOSE messages injected by the attacker. 
D. Preliminary experimental results 
Our protection scenario is 
simulated on Matlab, current values 
and CBs states are sent to IEDs 
over UDP initially and then when 
changing. IED commands to CBs 
are also transferred to the 
simulation in UDP packets. The 
described protection and attack 
scenarios are run. Figure 5 shows 
the resulting GOOSE 
communication captured with 
Wireshark protocol analyzer. First 
column is capture time. Source 
column gives the MAC address of 
publisher IED: the “1c” address is 
IED 1’s and “1a” is IED 2’s. Green 
messages from IED 1 corresponds 
to stable conditions with no fault 
and pale blue messages from IED 2 
asserts CB 2 state is closed. Orange messages from 
t=7.938807s to t=8.589623s evidences an overcurrent with 
operating delay for CB 1 still going on. Attack message is 
highlighted by the red rectangle. It consequences is that IED 2 
opens CB 2 and sends this new CB 2 state in the blue GOOSE 
messages. The orange message with capture time t=9.231743s 
is the next genuine message from IED 1. But it is too late, CB 
2 has already been open and the substation is not powered any 
longer.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Test beds are clearly needed for supporting research on 
cybersecurity in industrial environments such as power utility 
automation systems. The test bed presented here includes real 
IEDs for a hardware-in-the-loop simulation. It is part of a 
research project on intrusion detection in IEC 61850 networks. 
An experimental set up was required to validate tools and 
methods we developed (main one being an IEC 61850 NIDS) 
but further use is also possible for research and industrial 
purpose: penetration testing, vulnerabilities discovery, risk 
assessment, Factory Acceptance Testing, etc. Further 
development of the test bed includes more protection and 
attack scenarios with other protection functions and more 
complex systems, development of attacks exploiting the other 
IEC 61850 protocols, use of the other vendor IEDs available 
on G-ICS platform. 
REFERENCES 
[1] G. Andersson et al., “Causes of the 2003 major grid blackouts in North 
America and Europe, and recommended means to improve system 
dynamic performance,” in IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, 20(4), pp. 
1922-1928, Nov. 2005. 
[2] ICS-CERT, Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01), “Cyber-Attack Against 
Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure”. 
[3] Schneider, “Protection guide”, 2006. 
[4] Alstom, “Network Protection and Automation Guide”, 2011. 
[5] IEC 61850-2013, “Communication networks and systems for power 
utility automation” 
[6] M. Kabir-Querrec, S. Mocanu, P. Bellemain, J.-M. Thiriet, and E. 
Savary, “Corrupted GOOSE Detectors: Anomaly Detection in Power 
Utility Real-Time Ethernet Communications,” GreHack, 2015. 
[7] M. Parvania, G. Koutsandria, V. Muthukumary, S. Peisert, C. 
McParland, and A. Scaglione, “Hybrid control network intrusion 
detection systems for automated power distribution systems,” 44th 
Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and 
Networks, pp. 774–779,  2014. 
[8] G. Koutsandria, V. Muthukumar, M. Parvania, and  Peisert, “A hybrid 
network IDS for protective digital relays in the power transmission 
grid,” IEEE Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), pp. 914–
919, 2014.  
[9] S. Pan, T. Morris, S. Member, U. Adhikari, and S. Member, 
“Developing a hybrid intrusion detection system using data mining for 
power systems,” in IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, 6(6), pp. 3104–3113, 
2015. 
[10] T. Morris, R. Vaughn, and Y.S. Dandass, “A testbed for SCADA control 
system cybersecurity research and pedagogy,” Workshop on Cyber 
Security and Information Intelligence Research, 2011. 
[11] Idaho National Laboratory “Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
Observed in Control System Assessments by the INL NSTB Program,” 
November 2008. 
[12] H. Farhangi, “W4: Smart Grid Cyber Security,” IEEE Smart Grid 
Communications (SmartGridComm), 2013. 
[13] iSIS Available: http://isis.heia-fr.ch/EN/presentation/Pages/core-
competences.aspx 
[14] G-ICS Available: https://persyval-lab.org/en/platform/g-ics-sandbox-
green-er-industrial-control-systems-sandbox 
[15] IEC 62351-2007 “Power systems management and associated 
information exchange - Data and communications security” 
[16] L. Langer, P. Smith, and M. Hutle, “Smart grid cybersecurity risk 
assessment,” International Symposium on Smart Electric Distribution 
Systems and Technologies (EDST), pp. 475-482, 2015. 
 
